To what extent has ASEAN remained faithful to non-interference? Well, ASEAN did cold-shoulder the military junta in the 2021 summit, but that is as far as ASEAN could be forceful- there is no such thing as absolute non-interference. This is why a rethinking of the ASEAN Way comes into discussion. Hence, pronouncements by the group may only fall on deaf ears: in this case, the junta. That is, for example, when ASEAN reached a consensus for Myanmar, the regional bloc could only do so much 14 since it sticks to its non-interventionist policies. The most common flaw of the ASEAN Way that is being pointed out by experts is that it possesses a weak pragmatic potency in implementing decisions. But ASEAN’s “constructive engagement to critical disengagement 13,” in the word of Jones (2008), is a re-emerging development. ![]() Such is also the retort of the Myanmar junta. Observers argue that the mere implementation of the Five-Point Consensus violates the non-interference principle 12. These attributes further take its roots from Chapter I, Article 2, Section 2(e) of the ASEAN Charter 9, the regional bloc’s bedrock principles.In the current context of Myanmar, the notion of an ASEAN Way of engagement is being redefined again and challenged with the regional bloc’s role in dealing with the junta. Specifically, scholars generally agree to its four defining characteristics: the non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States, quiet diplomacy, absence of force and arms, and consensus in decision-making. Dubbed the “ASEAN Way 8”, it is, in a nutshell, an exercise of due restraint in diplomacy. But is this move an instance of carrying out the “ASEAN Way” of engagement?ĪSEAN has a distinctive style of handling the pressing affairs of its Member States. But through a diplomatic snub, ASEAN has shown that it is taking matters seriously in Myanmar. Unsurprisingly, this angered the military government and protested the move as a blatant violation of the founding principles in the ASEAN Charter. The Myanmar junta leader was left out of the loop and ASEAN instead invited a “non-political representative” 7 from Myanmar. With ASEAN’s patience running thin, it made no choice but to consequently exempt Min Aung Hlaing in the annual summit, which commenced three weeks after barring the envoy’s entry. Dozens of killings and attacks perpetrated by the military junta have also ensued. In fact, it barred envoy chief Dato Erywan Yusof 5 in meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, the detained, democratically elected opposition leader.6 At this instance, mediation is virtually impossible. But the junta had remained obstinate about ASEAN’s demands. Lastly, it reiterated the role of the special envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with the concerned parties. First was a call for “utmost restraint” in all parties concerned for the “immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar.”The second and third pertained to establishing constructive dialogue among parties mediated by an ASEAN Special Envoy to “seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.” The fourth stipulated the providing of humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre). ASEAN Member-States discussed pandemic response and reached a “Five-Point Consensus” 4 for Myanmar. ![]() Two months after the Myanmar coup, ASEAN, led by the rotating chairpersonship of Bruneiĭarussalam, called for an ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting. Particularly, the pressure to act lies with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in engaging in humanitarian and diplomatic efforts in the region. ![]() Furthermore, the grave human and civil rights situation 3 in the country, notwithstanding the scourge of the pandemic, has prompted international concerns. With the legislative assembly dissolved and a year-long state of emergency declared, supporters of the NLD have staged rallies and attacks 2 against the military junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. The regime change could not happen in a more crucial period-happening a day before the oathtaking of elected officials of the assembly of the Union. Claiming voter fraud in the 2020 elections, the Tatmadaw detained and charged President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and other NLD bureaucrats with various offences, ranging from the illegal importation of telecommunication devices to inciting civil unrest 1. On February 1, 2020, the military junta in Myanmar (also known as the Tatmadaw) staged a coup and took up the reins from the rightfully voted members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party.
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